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Barbara May Ellsworth Trust date March 19, 2013 (Intervenor Plaintiff) 
In accordance with Rule 24(d) Terry Huffstatler will be referred to as ··Terry'-'; Mark 
Ellsworth will be referred to as .:'Mark"; Michelle Thomas will be referred to as ""Michelle"; 
The Ellsworth Family Trust., dated May 1, 1991 will be referred to as the ·'1991 Trust" or Q 
··EFT'~~ The Barbara May Ellsworth Trust, dated March 19, 2013 will be referred to as the 
"'2013 Trust''; Barbara May Ellsworth will be referred to as "'Barbara''; Elmer ··Bud" 
Ellsworth will be referred to as "Elmer"; attorney Steve Skabelund (who represented Elmer 
and Barbara in connection with their estate planning) will be referred to as ·'Mr. 
Skabelund." 
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ARGUMENT 
On appeal, Appellants have argued that the trial court erred when it determined 
Barbara became the owner of the precious metals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7 5-3-102. 
To meet the conditions of§ 75-3-102, it must be shown that,'~ ... the devisee ... possessed 
the property devised in accordance with the provisions of the will. -- The trial court ruled 
that the Elmer's will C-'Will"') unambiguously named Barbara as the devisee who should 
receive the precious metals. Appellants contend there is ambiguity in the provisions of the 
Will which make it puzzling to determine whether Barbara or the 1991 Trust was the 
devisee of the will. Whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law. 
Additionally, Appellants have argued that the trial court erred when it determined 
Appellees rebutted the legal presumption that Barbara's creation of the 2013 Trust was 
unfair. The record in this case establishes that Barbara created the 2013 Trust because of 
information she obtained from her daughter Terry relating to a March 13 ~ 2013 email, and 
the trial court determined that Terry had overreacted to that email. 
The Brief of Appellees makes several arguments opposing Appellant's position. 
Appellants respond to Appellees' specific arguments below1: 
I. Appellees assert. ··£/mer Ellsworth's Will is not ambiguous and does not support 
the alternate interpretation that Appellants seek to apply. " 
This Court can review the Will and reach its own legal conclusions regarding it 
without deference to the trial court. Appellants contend the trial court could not determine 
1 For convenience, Appellants have adopted the outline format contained in Appellecs' 
Brief and have restated the specific headings used by Appellees. 
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the devisee from a simple reading of the Will because of the existence of ambiguity. 
Appellants have offered a reasonable interpretation of the Will which differs from the 
conclusion reached by the trial court. Where the Will does not clearly name a devisee, the 
trial court erred in concluding Barbara was the Will's devisee. As a result, the trial court 
erred in applying§ 75-3-102 and determining Barbara was the proper owner of the precious 
metals. 
A. Appellees assert, ''The terms of Elmer's Will and EFT are not ambiguous. " 
As a threshold issue, Appellants have not alleged on appeal that the 1991 Trust is 
ambiguous. The trial court appears to have relied on the terms of the Will in reaching its 
decision regarding the application of § 75-3-102. It is the Will Appellants claim is 
ambiguous. The language of the 1991 Trust is not at issue on appeal. 
In their brief, Appellees seek to have this Court focus on the statement, ~'If my 
spouse survives me, I give to her all items of Personal Property.'~ Significantly, the 
parenthetical -'as hereinafter defined" is largely ignored. This statement, when standing 
alone without the parenthetical, does not seem to be complete. A complete statement would 
be something similar to, •'Ifmy spouse survives me, I give to her all of my items of Personal 
Property." Another possible complete statement might be, '"If my spouse survives me, I 
give to her all items of Personal Property that are contained in my safe.~, The standalone 
statement which Appellees emphasize, however, does not clearly indicate what personal 
property is being devised because the sentence is not complete without the parenthetical. 
The trial court reached its conclusions by making an assumption about what Elmer 
intended. In its summary judgment ruling, the trial court stated: 
2 
Even though Elmer does not define the words "Personal Property, 11 the term 
is susceptible to construing it by its plain meaning. As a result, it can be 
assumed that Elmer's intent concerning the distribution of his personal 
property is the same as the conclusion a plain meaning of the Will 
communicates. 
(R. I 069-1070) (Emphasis added.) 
If the trial court is --assuming·~ what Elmer~ s intent was, then by definition the trial 
court could not have been relying on the plain meaning of the Will when reaching its 
conclusions. Simply stated, if the trial court could have determined Elmer's intent from the 
plain meaning of the Will. an assumption would not be required. 
As has been stated before, the Paragraph Fourth of the Will expressly states (in 
relevant part): 
If my spouse survives me, I give to her all items of Personal Property 
( as hereinafter defined). If my spouse does not survive me, I give those items 
of Personal Property (but not money, notes, documents of title, stock 
certificates or business property) to the individuals named in my 
Memorandum of Disposition of Personal Property. 
(Trial Exhibit 1 at page l 0) 
The trial court construed this provision as follows, ·'A plain reading of the 
Will explains that Barbara is to receive Elmer's personal property which was not 
transf~rred to someone else or to the family trust." (R. 1070) Essentially, the trial 
court is stating that because the precious metals were not transferred to the 1991 
Trust, and because the Memorandum of Disposition of Personal Property was not 
completed, Barbara gets everything by default. 
Appellees interpret Paragraph Fourth of the Will as follows: 
3 
Elmer's Will clearly states: "'[i]f my spouse survives me, I give to her 
all items of Personal Property." This statement is unequivocal-upon Elmer 
Ellsworth's death., Barbara Ellsworth was to receive all of Elmer Ellsworth's 
personal property. The only exception to this requirement is if the personal 
property were listed on a Memorandum of Disposition of Personal Property 
and that Memorandum included Elmer's signature and the identity of the 
intended recipient of the specified personal property. No such Memorandum 
exists. 
(Brief of Appellees at pages 11-12) 
Under these interpretations of the Will, the personal property either goes to Barbara 
or to the intended recipient named in the Memorandum. There is no other possible 
distribution of the personal property under these readings. These interpretations are 
problematic, however, when viewed against that plain language of Paragraph Fifth of the 
Will. Paragraph Fifth provides in relevant part: 
"My residuary estate" means all my interest in real and personal 
property, whether community or separate and wherever situated, which I may 
own at my death ( excluding property over which I may have a power of 
appointment) and which I have not disposed of by the preceding provisions 
of this will. 
I give my residuary estate to the Trustee then actin under that certain 
Trust Agreement named The ELLSWORTH FAMILY TRUST created on 
the 1st day of May, 1991, to be aggregated with ( and held, administered, and 
distributed as an integral part of said Trust Estate in the manner and subject 
to the terms and provisions provided for in the Trust Agreement, including 
any amendments thereto made during my lifetime .... " 
Paragraph Fifth clearly contemplates the existence of a possible residuary estate of 
personal property that could be transferred to the 1991 Trust after application of Paragraph 
Fourth. This directly contradicts the Appellees and the trial court's interpretation of the 
Will that all personal property either goes to Barbara or some person named on the 
Memorandum of Disposition. The very existence of Paragraph Fifth is evidence that Elmer 
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intended the personal property could pass to the 1991 Trust. In fact, Paragraph Fifth would 
have no meaning under the trial court and Appellees' interpretation of the Will. 
Under Appellants· interpretation of the Will, all of these provisions make sense and 
fit together. Appellants contend the Will should be read as follows: (I) If Barbara survives 
Elmer, then Elmer devises to Barbara all items of "Personal Property" which are 
specifically defined by Elmer: (2) Since no items of "Personal Property" were ever defined 
by Elmer, he must have intended that no specific items of "Personal Property" would pass 
directly to Barbara; and (3) Since no items of Personal Property passed directly to Barbara, 
the non-defined personal property would pass to the 1991 Trust pursuant to Paragraph 
Fifth2 of the Will. 
At bottom, there is an ambiguity as to whether Elmer intended to devise all, some 
or none of his personal property to Barbara via his Will. Where there is a question as to 
the proper devisee, the application of§ 75-3-102 by the trial court was error. 
1. Appellees assert, "The term Personal Property is easily defined." 
Appellees make the general statement that the term "personal property" is easily 
defined. Appellants do not necessarily disagree with this statement if the common 
definition of the term is intended to be used. The fact remains, however, if Elmer intended 
to use the common definition of "personal property" there would be no need to define that 
tenn in the Will. The only reason to include a definition of "'Personal Property" would be 
to provide a definition which was different from the common definition. 
:! As it turned out, Barbara survived Elmer. Had Barbara not survived Elmer, and because 
Elmer did not complete the Memorandum of Distribution of Personal Property. all Personal 
Property would have transferred to the 1991 Trust pursuant to Paragraph Fifth. 
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Appellees fail to explain why the parenthetical "'as hereinafter defined'~ is present if 
there was some meaning to be ascribed to it. The trial court found, '·Elmer's will leaves the 
reader anticipating a list of personal property that will specifically be transfer [sic] to 
Barbara upon Elmer's death." (R. I 069-1070) Thus, even the trial court was questioning 
what Elmer intended to transfer to Barbara. 
In this case, the common meaning of "personal property" cannot properly be used to 
construe the Will. Given the --as hereinafter defined'' language which is expressly contained 
in the Will, it can reasonably be interpreted that '"Personal Property" as used in the Will 
has a different meaning than its common definition because the Will indicates that the term 
will be defined in the document. In fact, it is at least as reasonable to assume Elmer 
intended a limited definition of "Personal Property'' as it is to assume that he intended the 
common definition. The term "personal property" as that term is used in the Will cannot 
easily be defined because it is not clear what Elmer intended. As was stated in Appellant's 
opening brief, "A contract is "ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms. or other facial 
deficiencies."' Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 25; 190 P.3d 1269 (Utah 2008). It is 
uncertain what meaning Elmer attributed to the term "Personal Property" because the 
anticipated definition is not included in the document. Consequently, an ambiguity exists. 
11. Appellees assert, ''Appellants' proffered definition is untenable in the context 
ofthe provisions ofthe Will and EFT 
Appellees argue, ··Appellants would have this Court endow a parenthetical with a 
meaning that it was never intended to have .... " (Brief of Appellees at page 16) Of course. 
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m making this statement Appellees are resulting to speculation regarding what the 
parenthetical was intended to mean. The real question is, ··Can the Will reasonably be 
interpreted to have more than one meaning?" While it is possible some sort of scrivener~s 
error (a term used by Appellees) occurred, the fact remains that the lack of a definition for 
the term ·'Personal Propertf ~ creates an ambiguity in the context of this case. Appellants 
have already provided a reasonable interpretation which differs from the conclusions 
reached by the trial court. Appellants interpretation is just as reasonable as the conclusion 
reached by the trial court because the ambiguity exists. 
B. Appellees assert, "Had EFT owned the precious metals. Barbara's gift o(the 
iunk silver would have violated EFT's terms; Appellants' acceptance of the 
iunk silver confirms that the precious metals were never part of the EFT's 
trust estate. 
Here, Appellees argue that Appellants acceptance of •junk silver" many years after 
Elmer died is somehow relevant to whether the language in the Will is ambiguous. 
Interestingly, this section of Appellees' Brief is attempting to use parol evidence to support 
Appellees' interpretation of the Will. 
Because the trial court ruled the Will was unambiguous, there was no parol evidence 
which was received by the trial court regarding interpretation of the Will. While there are 
valid reasons why Appellants accepted the junk silver from Barbara which have nothing to 
do with Appellants' understanding regarding who owned the junk silver. those reasons 
were never presented to the trial court because it ruled the precious metals belonged to 
Barbara. Litigation regarding the precious metals stopped when the trial court issued its 
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summary judgment ruling. In fact, in its ruling on the summary judgment motion the trial 
court stated: 
The alleged facts indicate that, at .some point before litigation, the 
precious metals may have been treated as if they had been transferred to the 
EFT. However, as stated before, transfer of property into a trust must be 
done in a specific way none of which include solely treating property as if it 
is part of a trust. 
(R. 1069 at footnote 5) 
Appellees are essentially alleging facts regarding Appellants' understanding of the 
ownership of the precious metals which are not part of the record. Appellants acceptance 
of junk silver in 2013 does not by default establish a concession by Appellants that Barbara 
owned those precious metals or that the Will is unambiguous. Appellants were not able to 
present parol evidence because of the trial court's ruling on summary judgment. 
By resorting to arguing parol evidence, however, Appellees themselves have 
established that parol evidence is needed to determine Elmer's intent because a simple 
reading of the Will does not provide enough information. Appellants believe they should 
be entitled to present parol evidence in the same manner Appellees have. That is one reason 
this appeal has been filed. 
C. Appellees assert. "The trial court correctly applied the statutory language of 
UC.A. § 75-3-102 and utilized Elmer's Will as evidence that Barbara was 
the rightful owner of the precious metals after Elmer's death. 
Appellees argue that the trial court's application of § 75-3-102 was proper. 
Appellees position can only be supported if there is no ambiguity in the proper devisee of 
Elmer's Will. As has been established above, there is ambiguity in the Will which 
precludes proper allocation of the statutory provision. 
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Appellees also argue that Appellants never introduced any admissible evidence for 
the trial court to consider. Obviously, since the trial court ruled the Will was unambiguous 
there was not an opportunity for Appellants to present parol evidence to the trial court. 
If this Court determines there is ambiguity in Elmer's Will regarding the devisee of 
that Will, then application of§ 75-3-102 was improper. There first must be a finding and 
conclusion regarding the actual devisee of the Will based on appropriate evidence. A 
proper finding has not yet been made because the trial court has not heard the evidence 
necessary to make that finding. 
IL Appellees assert. "The evidence presented at trial overcame the presumption of 
undue influence. ·· 
At trial, Appellants asserted a claim that Barbara was unduly influenced to create 
the 2013 Trust. In Utah, undue influence is presumed when a '·confidential relationship" 
exists between the trust or will creator and the beneficiary of the will or trust. Estate of 
loupe v. Carter, 878 P.2d 1168 (Utah App. 1994). The trial court expressly found a 
confidential relationship existed between Barbara and Terry. (R. 1659) When a confidential 
relationship exists, a presumption of unfairness arises which must be overcome by 
countervailing evidence. and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove absence of 
unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence. Robertson v. Campbell. 674 P.2d 1226 
(Utah 1983 ). Also, when a confidential relationship exists, and a transaction occurs that 
benefits the one in whom the confidence is placed, a presumption arises that the transaction 
is unfair. See, e.g. Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah.2d 3 78, 3 83,401 P .2d 710, 713 ( 1965). 
The finding of a confidential relationship shifts to the benefitting party the burden to 
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persuade the court that there was no fraud or undue influence exercised toward the other. 
In re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah.2d 277,293,293 P.2d 682, 693 (1956). 
The trial court indicated that Barbara's decision to create the 2013 Trust resulted 
from an email Mark sent to Terry on March 13, 2013. (R. 1678 at, 17) The trial judge 
determined that Terry considered the email to contain a ··threat'' and ··demand'" that Barbara 
resign as Trustee. (R. 1677 at 1 18) Further, the trial court expressly found that Terry 
overreacted to that email. (R. 1651) Additionally, Mark's email was never shown to 
Barbara. (R. 1912 at page 49) Rather, Terry explained its contents to Barbara. Id. 
The evidence at trial established that Barbara was relying on what Terry told her, 
and not the March 13, 2013 email itself. Thus, to rebut the presumption of unfairness, there 
must be some evidential showing that Barbara was not acting on Terry's overreaction to 
the email. Because that evidence does not exist in the record, the only conclusion that can 
be reached is Barbara was acting on Terry's overreaction. Accordingly, the estate planning 
changes were fundamentally unfair because Barbara was unduly influenced by Terry's 
overreaction. 
A. Appellees assert., ''Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence. " 
Appellees allege Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence which supports the 
trial court's factual findings. Appellant's position, however, is that the legal presumption 
of unfairness was not rebutted because Appellees failed to show that Barbara's actions and 
motivations in creating the 2013 Trust were based on accurate information provided from 
Terry. Under the facts presented at trial, Barbara may have had reasons to create the 2013 
Trust, but based on the evidence presented at trial, those reasons were triggered by the 
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March 13, 2013 email and Terry's overreaction to it. The facts establish this email was 
never shown to Barbara and Terry overreacted to that email. Appellants have marshaled 
these facts. The events with Barbara that transpired subsequent to this time were, based on 
the evidence in the record, tainted by Terry's overreaction. 
Appellees state that Appellants failed to marshal evidence supporting the trial courts 
finding that undue influence did not occur. Specifically, Appellees state: 
The trial court ultimately found that the evidence presented at trial 
--preponderates against a finding of unfairness'" and that the Barbara May 
Ellsworth Trust was ~'not the result of undue influence." (R. at 1657.) To 
support these ultimate findings, the trial court, among many other things, 
found that the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust was prepared with the assistance 
of counsel, that the new estate plan reflected Barbara's own wishes, and that 
Barbara had her own motivations to seek to create a new estate plan. 
Furthermore., the trial court found that Barbara understood ··that she owned 
the [marital home] and that she wanted to sell that residence to a particular 
family,'~ that she knew ··what her property [was] and" was able to ··formulate 
a plan for its disposition." (R. at 1661.) The trial court specifically referenced 
both Mr. Skabelund' s belief that Barbara did not lack testamentary capacity 
and Dr. Curzon~s medical determination that Barbara "was able to generally 
understand what was going on and make decisions concerning her assets." 
(R. at 1660-61.) 
Notably, Appellants are not contesting these findings on appeal. Rather, Appellants 
contend each of these facts came into existence because Barbara was unduly influenced by 
Terry's overreaction to the March 13, 2013 email. Pursuantto Utah law, once the trial court 
determined a confidential relationship existed, the burden then shifted to Appellees to 
prove absence of unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court found Terry 
overreacted to the emai 1. It is undisputed that Terry did not show the email to Barbara. 
Given these facts, to meet their burden to prove absence of unfairness, Appellees 
must point to evidence in the record showing that Barbara was not acting on Terry's 
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overreaction to the email. Because that evidence does not exist in the record, the only 
conclusion that can be reached is Barbara was acting on Terry's overreaction. Accordingly, 
the estate planning changes were fundamentally unfair because Barbara was unduly 
influenced by Terry's overreaction. 
B. Appellees assert, .. There is no burden upon Appellees to prove any other 
facts related to Barbara's understanding of Mark Ellsworth's March 13, 
2013 email. 
Appellees contend they had no burden to establish Barbara's understanding of the 
March 13, 2013 email. Appellees' burden at trial is clearly established by Utah law. The 
trial court found a confidential relationship existed between Barbara and Terry. Where a 
confidential relationship exists, a presumption of unfairness arises which must be 
overcome by countervailing evidence, and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove 
absence of unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence. Robertson v. Campbell, 674 
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983). Moreover, when a confidential relationship exists. and a 
transaction occurs that benefits the one in whom the confidence is placed, a presumption 
arises that the transaction is unfair. See, e.g. Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah.2d 378, 383, 
40 I P.2d 710, 713 (1965). This shifts to the benefitting party the burden to persuade the 
court that there was no fraud or undue influence exercised toward the other. In re Swan's 
Estate, 4 Utah.2d 277,293,293 P.2d 682,693 (1956). 
It is uncontested that Barbara's creation of the 2013 Trust benefitted Terry. As a 
confidential relationship existed between Barbara and Terry a presumption arises that the 
transaction ( creation of the 2013 Trust) was unfair. It then became Appellees' burden to 
establish the transaction was fair. 
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As is stated above, the trial court found that Terry overreacted to this email. 
Barbara's subsequent actions were based on what Terry told Barbara about this email 
(because Terry testified she did not show it to Barbara). It was Appellees burden to show 
the creation of the 2013 Trust was fair. Where the evidence in the record shows that 
Barbara only had information from Terry regarding the March 13, 2013 email. and where 
Terry overreacted, Appellees have a duty to show Barbara was acting independently of 
Terry to establish creation of the 2013 Trust was fair. 3 There is no such evidence in the 
record.4 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants request that this Court reverse the trial court's summary judgment 
determination that the Precious Metals were properly Barbara's pursuant to § 75-3-102. 
There is ambiguity as to who is the property devisee under the terms of the Will. Because 
of that lack of clarity. it cannot properly be concluded that Barbara was the devisee of the 
Precious Metals. If Barbara was not devisee of the Precious Metals. then the Court 
improperly relied on § 75-2-102 in concluding that Barbara was the owner of the Precious 
Metals. 
:- Appellees argue that Appellants assume Barbara could not think for herself. There is no 
evidence in the record, however, that Barbara did anything but rely on information she 
received from Terry regarding the March 13, 2013 email. 
.i Appellees reference testimony of Mr. Skabelund arguing that he thought the March 13. 
2013 email was a threat. (Brief of Appellees at page 22.) It appears that in this testimony 
Mr. Skabelund was referring to emails that were sent subsequent to March 13, 2013 by 
Michelle Thomas. The trial court referred to these emails in its Findings and Conclusions. 
(R. 1673 at 1 34) Mr. Skabelund's testimony also makes clear that he thought Barbara 
··always liked Mark,·· (R. 1912 at page 186 line 23) 
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Additionally, the trial court erred when it determined Appellees rebutted the 
presumption of unfairness of Barbara creating the 2013 Trust. While the evidence at trial 
established Barbara created the 2013 Trust because she was angry at one or more of the 
Ellsworth children, the evidence and findings of the trial court also establishes that Barbara 
was only acting on information she received from Terry. The trial court found Terry had 
overreacted. Where Barbara did not see the actual email, but only received Terry's 
understanding that it contained a "threat" and a "demand," the record can only support a c., 
finding that Barbara acted on Terry's overreaction and not on independent review of the 
email itself. Consequently, Appellees did not meet their burden to show fairness. 
Appellants respectfully respect that the Court reverse the summary judgment 
decision and remand this matter for further proceeding to determine Elmer's intent 
regarding the beneficiary of his Will. Additionally, Appellants request that this Court 
reverse the trial court's determination that Appellees appropriately rebutted the 
presumption of unfairness and direct the trial court to enter a finding that the presumption 
of undue influence was not rebutted by the Appellees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of January" 2016. 
Cragun 
ey for Appella ts 
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